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Participation, Pluralism and Pervasive 
Poverty: Better Governance and 
Human Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
REGINALD HERBOLD GREEN
“The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother ‘The pot got broken. ' 
Not 7 broke the p o t’ but ‘it got broken. ” . . .  A nd who did this? We did. We 
broke the pot. ”
-  J erry  John  R awlings  
President o f  G hana
Opportunities should be given to women fo r  greater participation in the nation's 
political and decision-making processes at all levels, especially at the national 
centres o f  power.
There should be greater openness in the process o f  designing the adjustment 
package, both within government and beyond. In particular, employers, trade 
unions and other relevant groups should be closely associated with the process 
both to improve the design o f  the programs and to ensure their fu ller  
understanding and support...
In making the protection o f  the poor an integral part o f  adjustment, the primary 
strategy should be that o f  enhancing their productive capacity through better 
access to productive resources and assets...
-  K h artoum  Declaration
182 Towards Political and Economic Reforms for More Participation 
P L U R A L IS M  R E V IS IT E D
Pluralism is a less-than-satisfactory term to use with respect to Sub-Saharan 
.Africa unless specifically defined for that purpose. The reason is its near 
monopolization by a specific formulation related to the conditions of a particular 
secular/Christian, industrial, high-income, bourgeois democratic society/polity 
(the United States).
Participatory pluralism is defined for purposes of this chapter as including
1 participation in preparation and dialogue leading to decisions as well as in 
articulation, implementation, monitoring, review, and modification;
2. ability and practice of, self-organization at levels ranging from basic community 
(village, neighborhood, workplace) to national; and
3. accountability o f leaders and officials both to the people who directly or indirectly 
choose them and to those they are intended to serve/lead.
Possibly good governance (a la World Bank’s “Long Term Study”) or 
participation (a la UNECA’s “transformation” studies and its Abuja, Khartoum, 
and Arusha 1987-1990 Conferences).
This definition does not define specific structures. For example, a single­
party system does not per se mark a polity/civil society as nonplural if a variety 
of organizations with participation, ability to act and to speak on behalf of their 
members, and leadership accountable to those members exist. If these 
conditions are met, the affiliation of such organizations to the single party may 
be quite consistent with pluralism.
All three elements are required. Genuine participation’s absence clearly 
prevents pluralism even if there are multiple, autonomous organizations. But 
genuine participation can be practiced within monolithic structures with at least 
substantial accountability. If these structures either englobe and control or 
forbid the existence of other structures and institutions, then they are clearly not 
pluralist however participatory, accountable, and majority supported they may 
be.
Ability to practice of self-organization unless it includes membership 
participation, selection of and accountability of leaders is not enough to 
demonstrate pluralism. Some organizations, for example, religious bodies and 
heavily state or party directed trade unions, are hierarchical with largely self- 
perpetuating leaderships accountable to themselves or to reference groups other 
than their members.
Clearly the definition presented is in the form of an “ideal type constnict. 
No civil society/polity' is or ever has been fully participatory pluralist. The issues 
in the analysis of any actual case are how wide and deep participatory pluralist 
practices are and what (both in form arid in substance^ and of what kind (e.g..
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legal, political, informational, real resources, political economic) are the main 
obstacles to broadening and deepening.
P L U R A L IS M  IN A F R IC A
There is a tendency in Western and perhaps not only Western scholarship to 
see both past and present African societies/polities as neither participatory nor 
pluralist. This appears to result partly from rather superficial study (especially 
of the precolonial period) and the use of competitive, multiparty electoral 
systems as a litmus test.
Many precolonial African polities were participatory to a substantial extent. 
In some at least particular interest groups or subclasses were self-organized and 
had spokespersons within the political process. (That others were excluded e.g., 
slaves and often women, demonstrates limits on pluralism not its total absence). 
Many groups, for example age groups (often parallel but separate ones for 
females and for males), religious bodies, economic groupings (including what 
could be styled merchants and artisans guilds) usually existed, had powers and 
functions of their own, and were to some degree accountable. The hereditary 
principle was, in practice, by no means totally inconsistent with participation 
and accountability. The selecting, in most cases, was from a range of candidates 
who could be picked without being seen to violate the hereditary principle. 
Recall further that a fairly draconian form of accountability was frequently 
institutionalized, for example, "destooling” and “deskinning” in most coastal, 
forest, and savannah Ghanaian polities. Except for political leadership, the 
hereditary principle was far from universal, for example, it does not appear to 
have applied to age groups.
Present African civil societies and polities do have multiple organizations, 
albeit that their number, diversity, freedom or space to act, and degree of outside 
control vary widely. The area of political parties is the only one in which this is 
rarely true. Mainland Sub-Saharan Africa, in practice, has had difficulty to 
experience competitive, multiparty systems in which a transfer of power by a 
victory of the opposition parties is a credible, present possibility.
At the national level, the main organizations with societal functions are 
usually religious, labor (more specifically, trade union), women's, and (less 
uniformly) cooperatives. Peasant organizations with broad bases and significant 
functions/influence are quite uncommon A range of other bodies for example, 
St. John’s Ambulance Society, Boy Scouts, usually exist but are largely urban 
and narrowly middle class/Westernized in their memberships Others, for 
example National Red Cross Societies, are common but vary from substantially 
participatory, accountable, and self-defining as to program (e.g., Mozambique) 
to de facto statal entities. Locational or home origin groups appear to be less 
significant than in the past, especially beyond mobilizing support for (or from)
their home districts or localities. In that sense, they are becoming less national 
and more regional or local.
The range at the regional level is probably analogous to that at the national 
level. At the local (basic community) level, there is usually a greater degree of 
complexity and more organizations. Some are adapted forms of traditional 
organizations (e.g., age groups and in some cases formally superseded hereditary 
political groupments). Others, for example peasants, coops, women’s’ groups, 
are parallel but lack connection to national organizational structures.
Exclusively ethnic based systems, whether traditional or manipulated, do 
not constitute pluralism. If they seek de facto separation from, let alone 
dominance over the state (e.g., Dinka in Sudan, Atnhara in Ethiopia) they 
constitute as grave a rejection of pluralism as of a national state or civil society. 
As historic location, and culture specific groups which accept pluralist civil 
societies and states, they can make contributions to pluralistic practice (e.g., 
Tanzania, perhaps Kenya), especially at home area development and local 
governance levels. But that is not what high profile “tribalism” and so-called, 
romanticized legitimate parallel power structures in SSA are about.
African one-party states are not a homogeneous category. They range from 
mass party ones with highly competitive primaries and substantial 
nonreselection (e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania) through de facto elite (or cadre?) 
parties with little popular participation or direct civil selection/rejection (e.g., 
Angola, Cote d'Ivoire) to cases in which the party could as well be called a junta 
(e.g., Zaire, Benin until very recently). So too the degrees of tolerance of 
criticism within party and affiliated bodies and, more particularly, from 
pluralist nonparty bodies or individuals varies tremendously. Despite having a 
mass party, Zimbabwe's state/party reaction to criticism is frequently jumpy and 
repressive. Kenya's (with a cross between an elite and a mass party) is more 
uniformly repressive. The junta one or no party states, predictably, rarely allow 
any criticism.
That most one party states in Africa are increasingly unstable and provide 
poor governance is indisputable. But to use Central Europe in 1989-1990 as an 
analogue to the probable or desirable may be misleading:
1 Overthrow by mass non-consent of any elitist or junta regime is historically and 
currently not uncommon.
2. Few African one-party states are or ever were in any basic sense Marxist-Leninist. 
The divergences are not uniform, for example M ozambique’s mass party, 
painstaking competitive elections and acceptance of people’s rejection o f sitting or 
potential leaders owes more to Presidents Mondlane and Machel than to Marx oi 
Lenin, whereas the power and position structures o f Angola seem to have historic 
roots in the great black Creole families o f late 1890s Luanda whose advance was 
then aborted by the new Portuguese Republic’s concern for petit blanc opportunities 
in the colonies (as well as at home).
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3. Some African single parties, via open primaries, provide wider choice of office 
holders than would systems with one dominant and one or more permanent 
opposition parties.
4 Regional parties lead to neither stability and normal competitive politics nor to 
viable national civil societies, and many de ju re  or de facto single parties were 
created to try to overcome this problem, for example, KANU absorption of KADU 
in Kenya’s and ZANU(PF)’s ofZA PU  in Zimbabwe.
5. There are cases, (e.g., Tanzania) in which the single party was in fact not 
necessarily viewed as permanent and there could be an internal dynamic toward 
multiparty politics.
The military and quasi-military regimes and the no party civil governments 
are also very varied Some respond (however problematically) to social and civil 
patterns with more than elite bases (e.g., Swaziland) and others seek, with 
limited success, to create alternative participatory structures to European/North 
Atlantic imports, which clearly provided little accountability or good governance 
(e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, and, on a favorable reading, Uganda). Others are elite 
systems of greater or lesser (usually lesser) governing capacity, competence, and 
civility (e.g., Liberia). The multiparty electoral systems are four: Botswana, 
Namibia, Gambia, Senegal Only the first pair operate in a way analogous to the 
European concept of such states and, barring gross incompetence or betrayal of 
its civil base, in neither could the governing party lose a majority by election in 
the foreseeable future.
P E R S IS T E N T  P O V E R T Y
Sub-Saharan Africa has never had a high level of achieved productive forces 
per capita nor a particularly egalitarian income distribution. Therefore, poverty 
has been both persistent and widespread.
The degrees, immediate causes, and forms of poverty were neither uniform, 
nor stable before, during, nor after colonialism. With very few exceptions, the 
achieved productive forces per capita declined, and the proportion of the 
population in absolute poverty rose from 1979 through 1983. In many (probably 
a majority) cases, this process of immiserization and/or disintegration has 
continued In others, it may have been halted but not reversed and in, perhaps 
an increasing minority, it has, at least tentatively, been reversed and some 
ground won back.
The basic causes of the decline vary as to nature or date and as to severity 
External economic environment worsening is present in almost all. Its onset 
varies from the mid-1970s (base metal and sugar export dominated economies) 
through the turn of the decade (beverage buoyed economies) to the mid-1980s 
(where petroleum sectors had fueled growth). Drought has been another red
thread running through most. Gross domestic economic (usually paralleled by 
political) mismanagement outside or verging toward a civil war context has been 
dominant in some cases, for example, Ghana (1972-1981) and Zaire (1960 — ►) 
respectively. External aggression (notably in Southern Africa) and civil or civil 
cum regional wars (notably in the Horn, Morocco/Saharan Democratic Republic 
and Uganda) have been the dominant cause in several cases (e.g., Angola, 
Mozambique, Malawi since 1985, Uganda, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan). 
Failure to react to other factors with adequate speed, degree, and flexibility is a 
pervasive characteristic (Zambia, Cote d ’Ivoire, Gabon, and Nigeria are possible 
examples).
More than one factor has usually been present, and it is their cumulative 
interaction that has led to the deterioration. For example, Tanzania had extreme 
terms of trade shocks over 1978-1981; major external aggression and 
consequential costs at the same period and again from late 1986; drought over 
1979-1985; and major policy mistakes (premature and overdone import 
liberalization 1978-1979, were not fully overcome until 1984 because the 
process of participatory quasi-pluralist consensus building took eight years)
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P O V E R T Y , P R O D U C T IO N  A N D  D IS T R IB U T IO N
Poverty exists personally and at the household level (e.g. entitlement to an 
adequate diet), communally (e.g., access to basic health and education services), 
regionally (e.g., marginalization from the national economy), rarely 
infrastructurally (e.g. transport and communication) and nationally (e.g., low 
gross domestic product (GDP)/capita and inability to sustain growth).
Therefore, in any assessment of policies, institutions, or societal patterns, 
productive efficiency matters. Without GDP, food production, and export 
growth higher than that of population, few or no SSA economies can attain 
either stable, strong economic structures and processes or substantial, sustained 
reductions of the number of persons living in absolute poverty.
Distribution is also crucial. The dominant impact on distribution comes 
from levels and specific structures of production. For example, the strength of 
trade unions and the institutional patterns of the labor market dominate real 
wage levels and trends, given output levels, whereas the pattern, support for, and 
trends in agriculture among small, middle, and large peasants (in the Maoist 
sense), capitalist-form enterprises (corporate or otherwise) and state or 
cooperative subsectors is likely to dominate rural income distribution (as well as 
levels, trends and makeup of agricultural output). However, the production 
impact on distribution may be indirect. The clearest example is the Botswana 
diamond sector. Seventy-five percent of gross surplus (itself about 75 percent of 
gross output) goes to the state, and a substantial portion is used to broaden wage 
employment, provide near universal access to basic services, and provide part­
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time employment and personal consumption supplements to members of poverty 
focus groups. Communal, infrastructural, and regional poverty (as previously 
defined) require a catalytic initial and usually a dominant subsequent central 
government role if they are to be addressed and redressed on a rapid and 
sustained basis. The implications of this for fiscal policy (on both revenue and 
expenditure sides) including levels and allocation should be evident.
D E V E L O P M E N T  W IT H O U T  G R O W T H ?
Nominally, absolute poverty reduction, especially personal and communal 
and perhaps, regional, could be pursued within a constant per capita GDP. Even 
that means a 3 percent absolute trend growth rate, well above SSA’s average 
since 1980. However, the social and political constraints on such a redistributive 
process out of fixed resources are usually (perhaps always, except in the context 
of total revolution or the immediate aftermath of decolonization or civil war) 
such as to prevent its being far reaching or lasting. Radically altered allocations 
of additional resources (relative to the existing pattern) are less difficult to 
attain, and especially, to sustain. For lower and lower-middle income 
economies, the room to maneuver from redistributing what exists is very narrow 
to negative, especially where (as in Tanzania) substantial anti-poverty and 
egalitarian redistribution has previously been carried out under more buoyant 
economic circumstances
P O V E R T Y  A N D  P L U R A L IS M
Poverty usually creates barriers to pluralism’s vitality and breadth. For 
example, poor, uneducated rural women usually have quite good perceptions of 
their own needs and goals and of what would be required to satisfy and make 
progress toward them. Crushing time burdens, gaps in knowledge and skills, 
negligible resource availability above survival requirements, and limited 
information on how to acquire what is missing (or how to organize groups to 
perform certain functions) often prevent their effective organization or 
participation.
A second strand is a narrowing of who is able to participate fully and who 
can afford to be a leader. Both require knowledge and time. Those with a 
resource margin above absolute poverty are more likely to have both. As a 
result, they can be more effective leaders and their choice by poor members need 
not be either manipulated or subservient. Equally, they may desire and try to be 
accountable. Nonetheless, the breadth of pluralism is narrowed and 
accountability rendered voluntary and optional, which is inherently dangerous.
At a somewhat different level, economic decline increases tension. States 
and major organizations find themselves less able to serve their members, less 
able to buy support (or buy off opposition), and less credible. At the same, time 
they face rising levels of complaints (at least as long as their good intentions and 
ability to act on them retain some credibility), of demands requiring resources to 
meet, and of challenges to their authority and/or legitimacy. The response may 
include seeking greater mobilization and participation (to offset losses in other 
resources) and greater accountability (to demonstrate that the palpable 
nonsuccesses do not relate to lack of good faith or competence). They are almost 
certain to include limitations on expression, and more particularly on 
organization, of dissent and caution in respect of autonomous organizations, 
especially if they seek to express dissent. Repression, at least episodically, is 
likely. Certainly these strands of constraint on an always limited, licensed, and 
scrutinized pluralism in Kenya have grown more severe as poverty has 
worsened.
There are countervailing factors. Survival is a great mother of invention. 
There are probably more autonomous rural organizations of poor people at the 
local level now than in 1980 in most SSA countries. The erosion of state 
capacity does create operational space. Some existing organizations have been 
strengthened. This can be ambiguous, for example, the long established Accra 
market women’s organizational structures have become tighter in terms of self­
protection against economic adversity and a state that is at best skeptical of their 
role. But these are oligopsonistic structures that are increasingly (and, on 
occasion, violently) exclusionist, so the net impact on poor consumers, 
producers, and would-be marketers is negative.
Other positive developments including broadening of roles for example, of 
churches into direct social action and organization, and transformation of 
traditional structures. For example, in Accra, although extended family systems 
weakened with too many members needing solidarity and too few having 
resources to provide it, new neighborhood, food seller/processor-linked, and 
savings/credit social groups emerged to fill some of the resultant gaps. These 
trends are evidence of the viability and serviceability of pluralism in contexts of 
increasing economic and social stress. But they should be neither romanticized 
nor exaggerated. On balance the trend has been negative. Survival is a 
necessary priority; by itself it is not an adequate one.
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P L U R A L IS M  A N D  T H E  R O A D  A H E A D
Looking at pluralism and rehabilitation, recovery, and economic 
transformation a relatively strong case can be made for its functionality in a 
“right to development”/  “human condition” strategy albeit (somewhat ironically) 
not in a neoliberal (“free markets make free men”) one. As the British
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experience since 1979 strongly suggests neoliberalism is inherently corrosive of 
pluralism, participation and accountability.
If production by poor people matters, the actual reach of the state is limited 
even in fields in which it should be present and decentralization is likely to be 
productively and distributionally efficient, then participation, accountability, and 
parallel (hopefully complementary) institutional actors are important That is a 
substantially more than marginal case for pluralism.
EM ERGING FOCI AND DIVERGENCES
The basic convergence is between basic human needs (the right to 
development) as an over-riding target with universal access to basic services 
supporting more production by/fairer payment to the poor as the main ways to 
achieve them and the human investment for productivity approach (originally 
neoclassical and associated with a fraction of neoliberalism).
This approach has been designed to refute the claims that although poverty 
and misery (up to and including premature death) may be deplorable “there is no 
alternative.” In the process it has created a politically salable message (vide the 
response to Band Aid) and, potentially, a way to convert immediate emotional 
human concern into longer-term backing for rehabilitation, recovery and 
redevelopment after survival.
There is not complete synthesis of the approaches nor tactical coherence. 
Production by the poor has encountered much more resistance (intellectually and 
by, e.g., the World Bank) than universal access to basic services apparently 
because the latter can be formulated more generally, elegantly, and 
econometrically and is consistent with strands of traditional neoclassical 
economics. “Human investment”, as a result of its origins and of the fact that 
middle and higher level personpower, who (at least once trained/educated) are 
not/will not be poor, is not always clearly related to the short-run human 
condition of poor majorities.
The initial tactical concentration was on the situation of people made poorer 
or more vulnerable by stabilization and adjustment programs. This did have the 
advantage of putting the Bank, and to a lesser extent the Fund and some 
bilateral agencies on the defensive. Rising malnutrition and, a fortiori, infant 
mortality linked to ones own programmatic advice is difficult to defend. At that 
level, at least verbally (and to a lesser degree programmatically), the battle is 
being won. Virtually all relevant bodies say that the human condition effects of 
stabilization and structural adjustment measures must be seen as important, and 
if otherwise sound policies cause deterioration, measures to offset them must be 
undertaken The Bank did collaborate in raising $70-80 million for the initial 
phase of Ghana’s PAMSCAD marketed as such a program.
Three limitations confront any approach focused primarily on the ‘Victims 
of stabilization and adjustment” (or even the poor among them, bankrupted 
formerly rich parallel marketeers, more pungently describable as “two-legged 
wingless vultures,” presumably worry few other than themselves and their close 
associates but former middle-income clerks and managers are prominent 
beneficiaries of some adjustment amelioration programs including PAMSCAD). 
First, it is hard to link most human condition deterioration to 
stabilization/adjustment programs separated from the crises which led to these 
programs. The counterfactual progression in the absence of the programs is 
often a downward path. The exceptions relate largely to certain types and levels 
of fees and to general budgetary deterioration impact on social services more 
generally; Second, no program designed solely to offset costs of adjustment can 
be expected to address the basic requirements of all poor and/or vulnerable 
people. Third, if the human condition is the key test, then how it changes for all 
people (especially all poor and vulnerable people), whatever the reasons for their 
initial poor condition, is the central justification or damnation of any applied 
economic strategy. Means to passing that test are necessarily integral to 
strategic design, not add ons.
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TH E HUMAN DIMENSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Any approach to development (or any other branch of applied political 
economy) inevitably has a positive or negative human rights component. Any 
approach centering on the human dimension has an inherent commitment to 
human rights. Whether to all human rights, with what priorities and to what 
extent is a more complex (and ultimately contextual) question.
The standard divisions between individual and communal, socioeconomic 
and civil, hortatory and enforceable, resource expensive and no resource cost, 
and unifying 01 divisive human rights are distinctly unhelpful. These supposed 
distinctions are objectively misleading and serve the subjective purpose of 
selective opposition to human rights and to regimes opposed on different 
grounds, not of supporting human rights holistically defined. Virtually all 
human rights are both individual and communal, for the moderately self-evident 
reason that human beings live in societies and interact with each other 
Freedom of speech is usually categorized as individual It has meaning, 
however, only in a community context (of auditors and interactors). Food 
security is usually classified as communal, but eating enough to avoid hunger or 
starvation is also a very individual need.
Similarly, socioeconomic and civil rights interpenetrate. Poverty and lack oi 
education have a negative impact on ability to exercise civil liberties. Prevention 
of freedom of speech, of organization, and of political participation frequently 
cripple socioeconomic program design, mobilizing power, implementation, and
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error correction feedback. The categories are not meaningless, but the 
assumption of inherent contradiction rather than of basic (even if not total) 
complementarity is wrong.
Whether rights are hortatory or enforceable is a contextual question with 
political economic (resource availability and allocation) and sociopolitical 
(political and legal norms and institutions/processes) aspects. Freedom from 
hunger/food security is in principle enforceable and in practice hortatory The 
resource problem is one of priority in allocation plus practicable delivery 
(Subsidy or gift? Access to earned income'1 Capacity to grow more?) 
problematic. The sociopolitical may either be of norms (Flow repugnant is the 
hunger of others? How strong the commitment to a right to eat for each and 
all?) or of institutions and laws (i.e., of effective accountability). The same is 
true of effective freedom of speech, that is, the resources and mechanisms for 
most individuals actually speaking so that their desired audiences can hear and 
respond to them either do not exist or are otherwise allocated. Norms against, 
and structures to prevent, communications oligopolization or monopolization are 
weak in all countries even if the nature of quasi-accepted oligopolists varies.
The resource cost distinction is a variation on the preceding one. Again it 
does not hold up Freedom from torture is regularly cited as no cost But 
properly equipped, trained and remunerated police, judicial, and prison systems 
are expensive. So is unresolved and unsanctioned crime. Torture (no matter 
how morally unacceptable or, for that matter, how ultimately dysfunctional) can 
be seen as a low resource cost shortcut to which poor victims of crime often have 
no objection if they perceive it as directed against clever criminals who terrorize 
witnesses and buy up lawyers and the legal processes. In reverse, if freedom 
from hunger in a given context requires low-cost means to enable poor farmers 
to produce, eat, and sell more food and urban workers to earn more and buy 
more food, the macroeconomic results can be very resource positive (i.e. more 
resources generated than used) even in the quite short run.
In principle, all human rights are ultimately complementary. In practice, all 
are both unifying and dividing Most entail losses for at least some present 
holders of power, prestige, and/or wealth. Others lead to tensions of right versus 
right, for example, small indigenous minorities' land and culture rights can 
conflict with the need to earn a livelihood of poor indigenous majorities. 
Ecological protection of the “wildlife heritage of humankind” which leads to 
opposing tsetse fly control even when the latter is vital to preserving the 
livelihood of poor cattle raisers and to preventing the reemergence of human 
sleeping sickness also raises conflict of rights issues. More generally, moving 
toward fuller empowerment to exercise rights costs real resources. Because 
these are scarce, genuine issues of prioritization, timing, and initial beneficiaries 
arise. If inability to import say drugs and papier cripples basic health and 
education services, while average calorie availability is satisfactory, promoting 
production for export is not irrelevant to enhancing effective human rights.
The human dimension approach has not systematically addressed human 
rights questions under that nibric, but it has made specific propositions that 
demonstrably go beyond the caricaturization of “bread and circuses” sometimes 
applied by critics of poverty-reduction oriented strategies. These include the 
identification of actual groups of actual poor people on regional, occupational, 
and gender bases as well as in terms of specific unmet needs (varying from 
group to group and place to place) and has been characterized by repeated 
insistence on participation linked to self-organization and expression by poor 
people.
The quotations from the Khartoum Declaration show certain problems. 
Increased participation is sometimes viewed as “given” (a noblesse oblige rather 
than a rights approach), and participation and organization are argued on 
productivity (avoiding errors, increasing mobilization) rather than normative 
grounds Accountability is backed without using the word. But the contrast to 
the “modernization” conceptualization and declamation is marked, and that with 
the “neoliberal” still greater. Participation by women and identifiable poor 
people communally and individually are at the center of the agenda and 
perceived as having the right to speak for themselves and to be listened to.
The human dimension approach has evolved quite independently of formal 
human rights dialogue. Even the relevant African Charter and still less the U.N. 
Declarations or Conventions are virtually never cited; the International Labor 
Organization (1LO) Conventions are, but rarely. This is not a desirable situation 
but it is factual. Economic-political-social condition and process-oriented 
contributors to the human dimension approach should pay more attention to the 
human rights stream. Human rights workers need to build concrete interaction 
with real people in real contexts and how they could be empowered to broaden 
and deepen their rights and especially the components of the right to 
development. Among African states there is a correlation between 
operationality of key elements of the human dimension approach and respect for 
human rights so entitled, but the concerns seem to be parallel and the 
interactions implicit and subliminal rather than articulated and expressed.
This is not because human rights is a Western concept in substance, as 
opposed to particular verbal and contextual formulations That argument does 
not really respect cultural pluralism It is either racist or a defense of valuable 
wrongs flowing from the denial of human rights. African societies and 
traditions do have clear commitments to the duties of rulers and the rights 
(including participation and self-organization) of subjects. What are perhaps 
Western are (1) separation of rights and duties (which is inherently 
incompatible with any social compact formulation) and (2) the isolation ot tin 
individual from human (social) contexts, leading to a binary individual/stat- 
nexus (curiously inconsistent with actual human contexts, and not least with 
pluralism). The African Charter encompasses both rights and duties and alsc 
the rights of peoples as well as of persons.
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AN AFRICAN OVERVIEW
The human condition, the social fabric of people’s lives, the state of their 
cooking pots, is the ultimate test of development. It is also among the vital 
means to achieving it To waste much of Africa's basic economic factor of 
production, the work of its women and men, by allowing them to remain locked 
in vulnerability, enforced overwork, or enforced idleness and poverty is both a 
human and social failure and gross economic inefficiency. The reality of what is 
happening today is starkly summed up in a 1985 UNICEF poster of a young 
African girl: “What do you want to be when you grow up?” “Alive.” For
millions of infants and young children over the past decade, it is a plea that has 
gone unanswered. They are prematurely dead Unless the right to live can be 
made real no other human rights are possible For the dead there is neither a 
future nor future access to other rights. The average human condition of 
Africans, women and men, the young and the aged, peasants and urban slum 
dwellers, the ill and the crippled, displaced victims of drought and of war, is 
appalling. Worse, it is not improving as it was in most countries, however 
slowly, prior to 1980 The rips in the social fabrics are lengthening, the cracks 
in the pots are widening.
These facts are statistically known from a wide range of indicators infant 
mortality and life expectancy, malnutrition and food supplies, access to pure 
water and to sanitation, illiteracy and access to education, income per household 
and environmental degradation They are sharply illustrated by the tables and 
figures at the end of this chapter. The stark reality is that the fabrics of many 
African societies; national, regional and local, have been wrent. The cooking 
pots of millions have been broken To pretend otherwise is to deceive ourselves 
and to betray the poor and vulnerable people; the women, the children, the 
displaced victims of drought and war, the poor peasants and the equally poor 
urban slum dwellers
PEOPLE AS ACTORS AND SC R IPTW R ITER S
No nation can be great and prosperous when the majority of its people are 
poor and miserable. Those words of Adam Smith set out a central truth. Many 
of his disciples preaching sermons in Africa and at Africans would do well to 
use it as a test of their own proposals.
The human condition of individual people, of families, of communities and 
ot societies is, as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has put it, “the only ultimate 
objective, justification and validation of development Human beings are ends 
not objects, actors not things to be manipulated.” O f course increased command 
over material resources; gross domestic product to use macroeconomic 
iminology, matters for a nation as well as a household. Food and health.
education and water, sanitation and environmental protection all require real 
resources. Of course balancing income and expenditure (closing external and 
fiscal imbalances), matter nationally as well as individually. Crashing debt and 
demeaning begging damage the human condition of persons, of peoples, and of 
societies as well as of families and individuals. The need to provide for 
tomorrow and the duty to the rising and future generations are central to African 
thought and society But these things matter because of what they mean for 
human beings, especially for poor and vulnerable human beings.
People are also in a basic sense means, means to achieving improvements 
in their human condition through economic recovery and development. Labor 
and land are two of the three basic factors of economic production From work 
applied to natural resources, the third, capital can be won and embodied in 
productive assets: tree crops and transport systems, improved fields and power 
plants or dams, hospitals or health posts and factories, houses and shops, schools 
and mines. But the poverty, the malnutrition, the inadequate access to education 
of a majority of the people of Africa increasingly weaken their ability to work 
long, hard, and productively. Their poverty increasingly forces them to abuse 
and destroy the land so the bone white of rained, dead, and dying land creeps 
wider across earth satellite pictures like the destroying cancer it is. By rending 
the fabric of society, growing immiserization is equally surely breaking the 
cycles of production, of reproduction, and of surplus generation and is creating 
contexts in which all human rights, however defined, are always in danger of 
erosion or extinction
To regard nutrition, health services, and education as the fraits of 
development to be deferred until after high production has been attained is self- 
defeating. Only the well nourished, healthy and literate can consistently and 
increasingly be efficient productive workers. To see access to pure water, 
reduction of women's workload, and child survival as goals for after economic 
recovery is to ensure that there will be, at best, delayed and stunted recovery. 
Women worn out carrying water for miles, tending sick children, and bearing 
replacements for those prematurely dead are not merely denied their rights as 
human beings but drained of the time and energy to produce more.
Similarly, to restore and to expand output requires the fuller participation in 
production of the poor, not their exclusion from it To provide tractors and large 
irrigated farms for the few and to ignore machetes and jembes (cutlasses and 
hoes) and improved seeds for the many is economic madness. It can not solve 
malnutrition (the poor will have no means to buy food) nor, usually, restore a 
viable trend rate of growth of agricultural output. To make this case against 
large public sector agricultural units and ignore its applicability to the private 
sector is to become trapped in ideological tunnel vision.
Production matters. It requires exports as well as textbooks, lorries as well 
as basic drags; efficient factories as well as (indeed to produce) jembes an 
machetes; taxes as well as protected wells. For some crops, in some places.
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under some conditions, large units and mechanization do make social and 
economic sense. The point is not to argue for basic services instead of production 
or production by the poor instead of by the not so poor. It is to stress that most 
present plans do the reverse. They fail to recognize the vital role of basic 
services and of production by the poor, without which recovery will be limited 
and development (even in narrowly econom ists terms) virtually unattainable.
S T A B IL IZ A T IO N , A D J U S T M E N T : A N D  OR IN ST E A D  O F  R E S T O R IN G  
T H E  H U M A N  C O N D IT IO N ?
Economic malaise, crises, and decline have weighed most heavily on poor 
and vulnerable people. When government resources are reduced, provision of 
basic services and maintenance of infrastructure are cut back, usually from the 
periphery Feeder roads go first, capital city highways last When health 
services face resource crises, rural health posts and clinics are usually hit first 
and central reference hospitals last It is to the credit of some African states' 
medical services and communities (and their external cooperating partners) that 
there are exceptions to that pattern, but, in general, the greater the distance, 
geographic, gender, indigenous ethnic, social, economic or political, from the 
centers of power, the greater the cutbacks.
When production falters, vulnerable people lose their employment, see the 
product of their self-employment fall, and have their entitlement to food torn 
away. They do not have the resources to ride out a crisis nor the flexibility to 
adjust to new ways of earning a decent livelihood. Most have indeed adapted 
enough to survive, without that they would have died. But millions could not 
adapt, they have died. For the poor and vulnerable people of Africa, death is 
very close, margins above survival very narrow As the proverb puts it, give a 
rich man less food and he will grow thin; give a poor man less food and he will 
die.
Crises of falling export earnings and import capacity, eroding government 
revenues, and inflationary deficits, inefficient policies, and under-utilized 
capacity are very real. But they are not more real nor more important than crises 
of rising numbers living in absolute poverty with rising infant mortality, of the 
re-emergence of killer diseases like yaws and yellow fever, of school systems 
near collapse and peasants without tools or seeds. They are part of the same 
human crisis. The first crises exacerbate the latter; reducing the latter is 
necessary to addressing the first.
Therefore, one basic test of all economic recovery and development 
programs is whether they will improve the human condition make poor people 
less poor and vulnerable people less vulnerable by making it possible for them to 
produce more and by increasing their access to basic services as well as their 
control over program and policy formulation and their ability to hold decision
takers and professionals accountable. If a program cannot pass those tests in 
prospect, and also in operation, it is fatally flawed and itself in need of structural 
adjustment or total redesign. This test is stronger than whether the stabilization 
and adjustment programs are the basic cause of poverty (they are not) or of 
whether they address the problems of poor and vulnerable people directly injured 
by some of their components (important but inadequate). Human condition 
recovery must go step by step with production recovery or neither is likely to be 
either efficient or sustainable.
Because the plight of the poor and vulnerable is the most desperate and 
urgent it is useful to indicate more specifically who these people are. Most fall 
into seven groups:
1. victims of prolonged drought and/or ecological degradation whose previous sources 
of income have been wiped out;
2. poor, often female-headed households pushed by land shortages onto marginal or 
sub-marginal land-pioneers and victims of the “rural sponge” effect which has 
limited the rise o f open unemployment/landlessness;
3. households in isolated or peripheral areas physically and institutionally at the end 
of the line for all goods and services;
4 small producers, usually primarily engaged in selfprovisioning but also selling food
even when they have a nutritional deficit, because it is then basic cash income 
source, unable to increase or even sustain output with declining access to inputs;
5. victims of war who are dislocated with loss o f access to health, education, and 
water as well as o f land, herds, homes, tools, seeds, and food stocks and plunged 
into a context o f physical insecurity and psychological trauma while government 
resources and physical capabilities are debilitated by war bills and destruction;
6. “ informal” urban sector members whose numbers have risen while incomes of the 
formal sector they served and supplemented fell and whose slum or exurb areas 
have become more crowded and less provided with basic services; and
7. urban wage earners whose real wages have plunged so sharply they and other 
household members have had to add “ informal” economic activities to limit the fall 
in their living standards to survive.
T H E  S L IP P E R Y  S L O P E  R E V IS IT E D
How the economies of most African states and the human condition of most 
African people came to be so debilitated matters; not primarily to win debates or 
apportion blame, but to understand how to win clear and “to look our mistakes 
squarely in the face lest we fall into repeating them,” as Rector Rui Balthasar 
Santos of Eduardo Mondlane University put it.
The radical, general worsening of the situation dates to 1980. After very low 
growth over 1970-1975, most African states made fairly rapid economic
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progress over 1976-1979 and human condition indicators advanced, even if 
limited and unequally distributed. Since then, all but a handful of Africa’s 
economies have been on a declining path in terms of per capita output, while 
poverty and vulnerability have been growing. Why?
One major answer ( it probably dominates output per capita declines), is the 
1979-1988 evolution of the international economic environment confronting 
Africa. The 1979-1982 recession and slow 1983-1988 recovery in the industrial 
economies have had a disastrous impact on Africa’s exports, valued in terms of 
import capacity. A World Bank study showed that between 1976 and 1981, 
several African economies, for example, the Cote d'Ivoire and Tanzania, as 
among the worst affected. Many primary products' real values (import 
purchasing power per unit exported) are at fifty year lows and the recent slight 
recovery in metals and virtually all projections give little promise of significant 
change. Industrial economy protectionism and dumping have hampered export 
diversification The financial flow position has also worsened. Real net 
concessional finance per capita (grants and new soft loans less interest and 
repayment on old) declined sharply from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s and 
have been stagnant since. Nonconcessional flows have gone negative. Africa 
has a debt burden relative to exports greater than that of any other region 
Payment on present terms is not possible and the attempt to sustain it is 
dramatically limiting imports, choking off recovery and worsening the human 
condition. That is not just the view of African governments, the African 
Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA), and the Organization for African Unity (OAU), but also of 
analyses by the World Bank, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the British 
chancellor of the exchequer and a banker-majority UN expert group.
Drought on a virtually continental scale exacerbated the already 
unsatisfactory food production trend. After good years in 1985-1986, 1987— 
1988 again saw several droughts. Until food production levels in normal years 
(especially by poor peasants) are much higher, vulnerability of output to drought 
is reduced and holding of reserves (especially at peasant household level) 
augmented, this scourge will regularly derail or reverse recovery efforts.
For many African economies, the macroeconomic and human costs of war 
are greater than those of any other exogenous shock, nowhere is this as brutally 
clear as in Southern Africa. Mozambique and Angola production (excluding oil) 
is about half what it would be had South Africa not waged war against them, 
directly and by proxy. As detailed in UNICEF's Children on the Front Line, by 
the end of 1988 over 1,000,000 human beings were already dead as direct or 
indirect results of the war, up to 12 million driven from their homes, and up to 8 
million in danger of starvation Other wars equally destructive of the human 
condition, including life itself, are less exogenous. The wars of the Horn of 
Africa, of the Sudan, and of Uganda have roots that are indigenous and centuries 
old Even in these cases external action and inaction has raised the potential for
destruction and made resolution of conflicts more difficult. The external actions 
include those of other African states as well as of great powers for example, 
Libya in Uganda, the mutual destabilization of the Horn states and a fortiori 
Morocco's colonial conquest of the Sahara Democratic Republic.
Not all causes are exogenous African governments have made policy 
mistakes and have been too slow in responding to the worsening external 
context In all candor, however, it should be noted that many of these decisions 
were taken on external advice and are now attacked by those who once pushed 
them With the adoption of APPER and of national rehabilitation, recovery and 
renewed development programs by a majority of African states, there has been 
substantial improvement on the economic policy front That again is not solely 
the judgment of the OAU or the UNECA; the World Bank and the United 
Nations General Assembly have said the same.
To date, these economic policies rarely give adequate attention to the human 
dimension nor enough priority to improving it. That is no new weakness, it 
typified most development plans and programs of the 1960s and 1970s. Then, 
however, with less constrained resources and a less hostile international 
economic environment, the old export-led, dependent, central city and higli- 
mcome group-focused model was consistent with some improvement in human 
condition indicators in general and in basic services extension in particular 
Today and tomorrow no such compatibility is likely to be within the grasp of 
most Africa states. Either the nature and priorities of development will be 
rethought and acted on new premises, or what economic growth there is will 
march hand in hand with rising levels of inequality and poverty, misery, and 
instability.
One concrete example is health. Life expectancy is much lower and 
mortality much higher in Africa than in the industrial North The largest single 
difference is in infant and under five year mortality. These are 30 percent of all 
deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa but only 2 to 3 percent in most industrial 
economies. The main causes are neonatal tetanus, five epidemic diseases 
(including measles, tuberculosis and polio), malaria, mipure-water-related 
morbidity (including diarrhea), and malnutrition linked diseases and/or loss of 
resistance to disease. For older children and adults malnutrition and impure 
water related diseases, malaria, a handful of epidemic diseases and accidents, 
treatable by first aid, are the dominant killers.
Uiban hospital care is largely irrelevant to reducing these death tolls in 
Africa, as it was in Europe. Yet it engrosses 60 to 70 percent of the typical 
African health budget. FYimary health care (including first aid), basic drug lists 
and supplies, extended immunization programs, oral rehydration and simple 
health education (including sanitation) are of proven low-cost effectiveness. But 
they receive 10 to 15 percent of the majority of African health budgets The 
warning of Cheik Hanudou Kane is even more timely now than when he first
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made it in 1965, “Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not immediately
summon the courage to revise the ways we think and take action ”
W HAT IS TO  BE DONE? ROADS BACK AND FORW ARD
To make the human condition integral and central to Africa’s economic
recovery and development requires a comprehensive political and socioeconomic
strategy encompassing at least eight elements;
1 recognition that people matter as subjects and ends of and main means and actors to 
attaining stabilization, recovery' and renewed development;
2 understanding that throwing away much of Africa’s most basic factor o f production,
the labor o f its people, by excluding the poor and vulnerable, is economically
wasteful and inefficient;
3 acting on the reality that marginal rates o f economic, as well as social return from
enabling poor people to produce more, are often high (a real problem is making
small, contextual, poor-people-centered projects visible to central decision takers 
and credible to bureaucrats and analysts and making regulations compatible with 
implementing them),
4. comprehension that health, education, and pure water are both human and social 
goods and important to maintaining present and raising future economic 
productivity, to making possible fuller participation in production by women, who 
are the chief victims of illiteracy and on whose backs falls the burden of fetching 
water and caring for the sick;
5. focusing on employment and production, not subsidies and relief; e.g. through 
employment programs to relieve drought losses and rehabilitate the economic base 
o f poor households ,
6. articulation o f short-term priorities to lay foundations for long-run sustained 
development; for example, in applied, field tested, peasant user friendly, producer 
cost effective agricultural research begun now to make it possible to sustain 5 
percent agricultural growth in the late 1990s;
7 political as well as economic awareness that participation in production by poor 
people is crucial to underpinning their survival and the improvement o f their human 
condition (without it their social and political participation will remain limited and 
perpetually at risk);
8 comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency o f rending the fabric of 
society: strikes and riots, go-slows and loss o f morale, steadily growing grinding 
poverty and recurrent economic disasters without human rehabilitation are 
devastating even in narrow economic terms.
poor and the vulnerable are not amorphous masses, but groups of human 
mgs To fail to see what their needs are, as perceived by themselves, is to
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exclude them. To suppose their needs and capabilities are uniform is to render 
many people invisible. These errors and blindnesses are particularly frequent 
and serious with respect to women. Most African women are excluded or 
invisible but also overburdened and under-assisted. Basic barriers to economic 
as well as human development posed by the excessive work load most African 
women bear are rarely recognized clearly. The implications of the gender 
division of labor in agriculture are rarely taken account of by agricultural 
research and extension. These elements are central to serious efforts to improve 
the human condition. Three elements are crucial:
1. universal access to literacy, to basic education, to primary health care, to pure water, 
to agricultural inputs, to fuel, is disproportionately beneficial to women because 
when access is limited, they are disproportionately deprived of them;
2. serious attention to reducing women’s workload, for example, by closer water and 
health facilities, by programs (e.g., immunization) reducing child illness, by 
improving technologies relevant to female tasks (e.g., food processing, moving water 
and fuelwood, as well as food production);
3. central roles for women in planning/decision-making about projects and programs 
that primarily affect them, for example, rural water supply and maintenance, 
sanitation, food crop research and extension.
The preceding conceptualization is not, especially in this full-blooded and 
consistently articulated a form, dominant in Africa today. But neither is it 
absent or simply the importation of an external intellectual fad. In fragmentary 
forms, diverse formulations and different degrees of comprehensiveness and 
forcefulness it is both widespread and gaining ground from farmsteads to 
capitals, from the excluded to the intellectuals, from the marginalized to the 
powerful, and in commitment and praxis as well as principle and prose. The 
Khartoum Declaration of March 1988 on the Human Dimension does embody 
priorities and perceptions that were not equally prominent even three years 
earlier. However wide the gap between affirmation and action the movement is 
on both fronts not just affirmation.
A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y — R E C O N S T R U C T IO N — P L U R A L IS M
Accountability is used here in the sense of being able to select, sanction, and 
remove leaders or major institutional actors. For accountability to be reliable and 
efficient requires both adequate data from the leaders on their actions in a form 
allowing independent evaluation/judgment and also a capacity for such 
evaluation/judgment by the recipients.
The case for accountability is not that all choices/decisions will be 
normatively just or even functionally desirable for those holding the leaders to
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account. Democracy neither needs to be nor can be defended on the basis that 
under it all decisions are just and/or functional with respect to the goals that led 
to their being taken. The case is that without accountability, democracy is at 
best voluntarily given by leaders, as is participation, and decisions are likely to 
be even less efficient from human condition/human rights perspectives. The 
relevance of pluralism is that independent/autonomous organizations provide 
channels through which to route, and bases from which to press for, 
accountability. Which organizations depends on contexts.
S O M E  P R A C T IC A L  ISSUES IN A C C O U N T A B IL IT Y
Accountability is fragmented, uneven, incomplete, and feeble in SSA 
Formal structural examination does not help understand many cases because the 
actual processes and accountabilities vary widely, for example, the single-party 
states in Tanzania and Kenya afford very different degrees of power to enforce 
accountability to peasants absolutely and relative to other groups Similarly, 
ombudspersons, where effective at all, usually tend to provide access not
primarily to the poor who would otherwise have none but improved access for
diligent middle-class members.
Severe processual problems arise among levels. For example, a society in 
which a political structure is relatively open and accountable from the base up 
and is explicitly superior to the governmental staictures officially, should, on the 
face of it, guarantee accountability. But if each party level can call each 
government level to account, incoherence and wide divergences in praxis are 
likely, whereas otherwise the base up then across and top down way of holding 
accountable is cumbersome and slow
Contextual differences with direct local accountability are hard to reconcile 
with national coherence and it is not safe to assume either that the latter is 
reivial or that the closer to the base political or governmental
institutions/personnel are the greater their concern with the human condition or 
felling of responsibility to poor people. Acceptance of accountability and 
perception of responsibility does not lead automatically to meaningful 
acceptance of base-level participation in operational policy articulation, 
formulation, and decision making, still less to a guarantee that policies will in 
fact, serve their intended beneficiaries well, cost efficiently, or even at all.
External agencies have genuine problems with respect to client
accountability. They already have accountability structures to governing 
councils and/or parent ministries. These are usually along standard 
intergovernmental organization or national institutional lines. They do not 
\en when the council does include South governments) result in real 
accountability to any particular client on any specific issue, even at national 
v At best there is an openness to listen to client critiques and to try (on, at
best, a voluntary normative responsibility basis) to respond to them. More rarely 
there is also involvement of clients in program design and results monitoring.
It is easier to criticize this pattern than to suggest alternatives. Multiple 
lines of accountability will lead to conflicts and conflicting demands. How these 
can be minimized, guidelines for weighting different obligations devised, and a 
workable conflict resolution procedure created is by 110 means self-evident, 
especially across an array of widely divergent host settings. Yet for some 
agencies 111 some host contexts to make the attempt is essential if operational 
progress is to be made.
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PRO M O TIO N , EM PO W ERIN G , EN JO IN IN G , SANCTIONING
Achieving progress toward greater and broader effective access to human 
rights and a fuller and less precarious human dimension to rehabilitation and 
development require complex processes. The failure to realize and to articulate 
that realization is partly the result of the parallelism rather than interaction of 
the human dimension and human rights approaches. Advocates of the former 
stress rational explication and normative campaigning to promote change and 
resource allocations to empower it. They are less prone to consider structures to 
forestall, and procedures to enjoin, deviations from stated goals and still less 
prone to consider how offenders (or at the least offenses) could be sanctioned 
and grievances redressed. Human rights lawyers tend to stress sanctioning and 
enjoining (by court cases or public pressure) plus a different style of normative 
promotion with little attention to institutional means to prevent or limit harm 
and even less to resource provision to empower states and societies, as well as 
persons, smaller communities, and enterprises, to achieve, to provide, and to 
exercise human rights. Logically, the two approaches are complementary but 
with little interaction to date, this is not obvious and they are often misconstrued 
as alternative or antagonistic
Promotion (or consciousness and coalition building) is a first step toward 
realizing change. People, including groups with substantial cumulative actual or 
potential power, need to be convinced that: the change is desirable; as well as 
practicable, and will serve their needs and/or interests. Without that base, the 
only way to achieve change is top down imposition (or small-scale quasi- 
anarchic parallel system construction).
Empowerment involves, first, identifying what specific resources (by no 
means only financial or material resources) are needed to achieve what goals, by 
(and for) whom, over what time span and, second, devising ways to mobilize 
additional or reallocate existing resources to those ends This is no trivial 
matter, Damascus Road conversions are not always necessary (some 
governments and leaders, as well as many poor people, do believe in huma 
rights and give priority to the human dimension) and are rarely sufficient
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does no good to seek to sanction a very poor country for not instantly providing 
universal literacy, universal access to primary health care, and universal 
adequate dietary entitlements. Persons and small communities (or enterprises) 
need political space to organize and to act, access to knowledge, trained 
personnel, and genuinely supportive expert assistance in specialized areas, as 
well as material and financial resources. Societies and states need the same 
The political space may be international (it is dangerous to be a radical 
democratic state socialist near the United States) or national (entrenched 
indigenous elite minorities and less inherently elitist bodies, such as some trade 
and student unions, can destabilize radical reformist governments: vide the road 
to the assassination of Thomas Sankara)
Promotion and empowerment are not enough Genuine mistakes and hostile 
intentions (including vested interests in lethargy and an easy life as well as in 
enjoyment of exploitative profit or non-accountable power) exist. It is crucial to 
avert, prevent, and enjoin actions or inactions which hamper, halt, or reverse 
progress toward fuller attainment of human rights
Prevention, not redress after damage, and structures leading to appropriate 
initial actions not procedures for enjoying wrong ones are the basic institutional 
and processual goals. Institutional structures that build in participation and 
accountability (as well as ones that ignore or prevent them) can be devised and 
operated. Resource allocation criteria in favor of the human dimension 
approach can be articulated and prospective policies, ongoing processes, and 
retrospective evaluation of results monitored in that light Institutions can 
facilitate and create a normal pattern of acceptable conduct. They can limit the 
number and degree of but cannot avert deviations. The processual goal is to 
identify and enjoin (socially, politically, and legally) promptly and effectively by 
grievance raising, conciliation and injunctive relief procedures with power to 
provide prompt, equitable and effective resolutions of real or potential conflict 
accessible to poor people and their organizations as well as to weak minority 
peoples and communities.
There will be violations of human rights and debasement of the human 
condition. Need, honest error, and greed combine to ensure that. To create 
incentives to avert their multiplying and to make public the challenges and 
threats to human rights/human dimension there must be laws, legal processes, 
and accessible procedures to sanction these offenses. Compensation for damage 
done is sometimes an equally important component of effective redress as is the 
imposition of criminal, as well as civil, penalties on gross offenders.
There is a need to pay attention to causation Need-based offenses do not, 
with very rare exceptions, justify criminal sanctions. Hanging every peasant 
who cuts down trees or bushes for fuel or house poles in areas that are 
ecologically at risk is neither an equitable nor a conceivably effective way of 
halting erosion, desertification (strictly speaking neo-desertification), or 
deforestation. (Indeed the wood requirement for the gallows would be so great
as to have the reverse effect.) Empowerment (in this case by silviculture 
education plus relevant seedlings, by state or community reafforestation and 
erosion control, by alternative fuel provision and/or by selective, voluntary, 
assisted resettlement) is a precondition for halting need based erosion of the 
human condition. When empowerment is in process, civil regulations are 
needed as is their enforcement, fining those who chop down genuinely 
community planted and tended trees is hardly unreasonable and may be 
essential. Honest error should not be confused with greed or malice Honest 
error after careful study and evaluation of options in a participatory, accountable 
context should rarely be sanctioned at all To do so is to create an incentive 
never to decide but always to postpone or refer What needs to be sanctioned is 
negligence.
Severe sanctions should apply to violations related to greed, for power, for 
non-accountability, or for material gain. The first goal is to stop the offense and 
the broader to avert (or at least reduce) its repetition. If major damage has been 
done, securing redress (from the offender if possible, otherwise from more or 
less innocent parties, in practice likely to be taxpayers or users of other public 
services if the state reimburses, more able to bear the cost than the initial 
victims) is important but limiting future damages to future victims is always 
central. Exposure to public opinion of a high-profile sanctioning process is 
costly and the real risk of sanctions is perceived as good economic reason to 
allocate resources to avoid being sanctionable, the process matters by itself in 
addition to the impact of its outcome Union Carbide has been shaken (almost to 
pieces) by the Bhopal case, and other chemical companies appear to have 
decided that, at least to some extent, prevention and safety pay.
Sanctioning institutions and structures matter. The law 's delay is 
proverbial. Thought (and action on it) as to what civil and criminal remedies 
are needed for human rights violations/human condition debasement is needed. 
The issues are complex —  criminal law processes often do not cover redress to 
victims; in civil cases procedures other than standard gladiatorial court contests 
may offer effective redress faster. But access is crucial no matter how 
appropriate the institutions and procedures. Access to specialist personnel and 
to financing the costs of the process. Poor people do not and, in any practicable 
and equitable legal system, cannot, argue, finance, and win major court cases by 
themselves. They need specialists to support them and money to pay them, both 
of which are often unavailable in Africa
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PLURALISM  —  PO TENTIAL RELEVANCE TO  BETTER 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPM ENT
The role of pluralism is to increase the probability that persons, especially 
poor persons, will be able to organize themselves to act, to influence the actions
Participation, Pluralism and Pervasive Poverty 205
of others, and to hold other major actors to account. At the national provincial 
and basic community level three clusters of issues or topics appear to be central, 
civil society and its room to organize and to act, accountability, and access to 
channels designed to protect empowerment.
Civil society is used here as a shorthand for freedom of self-organization, 
self-expression, and self-operated action initiatives especially, but not only, at 
base level It need not mean pluralism in the North American sense and is 110 
more inconsistent (or at any rate antagonistically contradictory) with 
decentralized, democratic single mass party systems than with bourgeois 
democratic structures.
The necessity of room to maneuver for civil society rests on two legs: first, 
people in base communities or action groups have knowledge of their own needs 
and potentials no one else does or can have and second, unless poor people and 
marginalized groups are able to participate— in production, in mobilization, in 
decision-making and in calling decision-makers (including their own 
leadership) to account there will be no objective and especially no institutional 
power base to protect their interests from counter-attacks by other interest groups 
who are organized.
Room to maneuver requires self-organization and control over 
organizations. Some aspects require immediacy and operational autonomy 
Even with local-level freedom of action within nationally integrated single­
channel structures, it is doubtful whether this can be achieved or sustained and 
reasonably certain it can be achieved more easily and sustained more securely 
with multiple organizational structures. The cases for specialization and 
division of labor and for competition are not inherently capitalist. Mikhail 
Gorbachev seems to agree, albeit his case for quasi-pluralism is purely 
functional and within a control frame arguably too rigid for the sought quasi- 
pluralism to have adequate vitality and impact or even much staying power. The 
evident cases are religious and cultural organizations. Almost equally strong 
ones can be made out for economic-interest (or sub-class) based organizations, 
for informational channels, and for gender- and age-based groups. It is simply 
untrue that all local-level organizations or actions need to be consolidated into 
provincial and national structures so long as coordination and mechanisms to 
correct damaging inconsistencies exist.
Accountability faces two very real problems. Multiple channels and 
organizations do not guarantee internal accountability of any. Lack of 
accountability in SSA is frequently pervasive, not limited to central political 
institutions. There appears to be a correlation between political channel non 
accountability and non-accountability of other organizations. This should not be 
cause for despair but it is cause for further reflection as to the conditions and 
contexts appropriate/conducive to achieving and sustaining accountability in 
various types of organizations, especially ones large and complex enough that 
direct, face-to-face accountability is impracticable.
Accountability takes time. It need not slow down action so much as to be 
dysfunctional. But although most members want accountability to be available, 
so long as leaders and officials deliver what are broadly viewed as acceptable 
results, only a small minority of members are willing to devote much time to 
enforcing and operating accountability. Unless an ongoing base level of 
accountability praxis exists, it is wishful thinking that it can suddenly be turned 
on when things go wrong.
Rapid institutional shifts often fail to build in accountability and, thereby, 
defeat their own objectives. The 1984-1986 privatization of much of Tanzanian 
crop marketing to reorganized primary co-ops grouped under recreated co-op 
unions is a textbook example. The co-ops were set up accountable to neither 
peasants nor state but only to a managerial cadre whose uneven standards of 
efficiency and probity had been only too clearly shown over 1960-1976. As a 
direct result, marketing costs have risen and the crop marketing deficit has been 
“privatized” in the form of bank loans to cover losses. Because the Tanzanian 
state is accountable and responsive to peasants, halting loans to co-ops (and thus 
purchases of peasant crops) was viewed as inconceivable. But the losses became 
by 1989 the main engine of inflation and co-ops were increasingly unable to buy 
crops promptly. The 1990 World Bank imposed ban on bank loans to co-ops 
(with the rest of the private sector physically incapable of filling the gap) 
reduced peasant real prices for crops by 50 percent. It almost certainly played a 
major role in the draconian March Cabinet reshuffle. Because it paralyses trade 
and exports and threatens the survival of the state, it is likely to be reversed. 
The point remains, speedy shifts failing to build in accountability in key 
institutions can have very high costs even in narrow macroeconomic terms.
Protecting empowerment, especially of poor persons and groups (subclasses) 
that are predominately poor or vulnerable is central to a “human 
condition’Y’right to development” oriented strategy and praxis. The impact of 
pluralism is unfortunately, distinctly problematic. This is not inherent in 
pluralism but a probable result of partial pluralism in societies in which resource 
distribution (including time, knowledge, and influence on/power over central 
political institutions) is radically unequally distributed. Trade unions are 
historically most effective at organizing employees with above average skills and 
wages. Their interests are unlikely to be identical to those of workers with lower 
skills and wages and a fortiori to those unemployed. In SSA, non-wage 
predominantly labor incomes, that is, those of peasants, other household 
producers, and small scale enterprise operators, are central to more households 
than are middle and large employer wage payments. Their interests are in some 
areas analogous with those of trade unions, but in others they really are 
competitive. The answer does not lie in suppressing or coopting trade unions 
but in building up equally strong organizations in other labor income subsectors 
Until that is achieved the view that trade union strength and freedom to
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maneuver may not serve the interests of the majority of poor households is by no 
means necessarily disingenuous.
C O N S T IT U T IO N S , C O N S T I T U T IO N A L  O R D E R S  A N D  P L U R A L IS M
In SSA, he average gap between constitutional orders defined as basic 
political/civil society goals and operating principles and constitutional 
documents (constitutions) is exceptionally wide. Constitutions do not 
comprehend important parts of the constitutional order. Substantial gaps 
between constitutional (in either order or document sense) goals and practices 
exist, and formal documents tend to lag behind praxis.
The argument that constitutions are used to mystify and to manipulate by 
dominant decision-making coalitions (often quite narrow ones), which have very 
different goals and preferred operating principles, may well miss the bottom 
line. Many African constitutions are simply irrelevant They do not, in any 
meaningful sense, represent the goals or operating principles of any significant 
interest groups/subclasses, are not seen as relevant to constitutional orders, and 
exist because it is believed that, like national anthems, coats of arms, and flags, 
constitutions and “development plans” are something that states have to have for 
ceremonial and formal symbolic purposes
The reasons for this situation are by no means obscure Precolonial Sub- 
Saharan African polities rarely had written and often did not have formally 
codified oral constitutions. (The exceptions to the first rule were almost without 
exception both transitory and cases of precolonial neocolonialism, e.g., the Fanti 
Confederacy and the Rehoboth Captaincy.) They had constitutional orders and 
frequently evolving, disintegrating, or structurally changing ones, but formal 
constitutions of the Western type played negligible roles in them In many 
cases, the colonial states also literally did not have constitutions and where in 
some sense they did these were primarily pieces of administrative and 
organizational law. It cannot be asserted that the constitutional orders of the 
metropolitan states were the actual constitutions of the colonial states, very much 
au contraire.
The first round of independence constitutions, with few exceptions, were 
formed and imposed by the departing colonial state with limited input from the 
emergent domestic constitutional order. This did less than nothing either for 
their contextual appropriateness, for commitment to them, or to constitutions 
more generally as documents of real significance. Exceptions include Ethiopia, 
but in that case the Imperial Constitutions were luxury consumer goods import 
rather like the Western liberal/philosophy elements used as Christmas tree 
ornaments on the Tsarist state by Peter and Katherine the Great Two other 
exceptions are Angola and Mozambique where revolutionary movements drafted 
and enacted them. Although idealistic (in the technical sense of that term)
despite their Marxist-Leninist form, they were seen as more serious documents 
and might have been so had both states not been engulfed by wars of resistance 
to external aggression. Arguably, Mozambique has had an evolution of its 
constitutional order at least in part organically linked to constitution evolution
Subsequent constitutions have rarely emerged from genuine reflective and 
participatory processes. This is fairly evident in the case of the products of 
coups and of elite revolutions but is of broader relevance. The post-military 
government Ghanaian and Nigerian constitutions were in certain senses the 
outcome of reflection and of participatory processes. However, they focused so 
heavily on averting repetition of particular routes to breakdowns that had led to 
military takeovers as to be only formalistically concerned with many basic goals, 
nonoperable and remarkably open to new abuses and disintegrative tendencies.
This generalization does have exceptions. The post independence 
Tanzanian constitutional reshapings (including the party constitutions) do arise 
out of the evolution of the constitutional order. Whatever their limitations, they 
are serious, related to reality, and have a participatory and political power base 
grounding. The post-Lancaster House Zimbabwean constitutional amendments 
(here perhaps especially the ZANU-ZAPU merger modifications to the surviving 
ZANU constitution) may well represent the start of a similar process. Namibia's 
somewhat over determined constitution is a serious exercise in national 
reconciliation.
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CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS AND TH E IR  IM PERFECTIO N S
African states have constitutional orders. In respect to breadth of base (or 
more accurately narrowness), predictability of decisions, stability of procedures, 
and scope or reach of the constitutional order, many are objectively weak and/or 
eroding. Some are disintegrating or excessively hard to define as other than 
pathological except in terms of a narrow group of beneficiaries, for example, 
authoritarian kleptocracies in which the purpose of public office (however 
acquired) is private gain and the chief means of securing political (or military) 
support is fairly literally buying it. The most frequently cited cases are Zaire, 
Sierra Leone, and Liberia, but despite its origins and initial democratic patina 
the actual nature of the last Nigerian civil state tended in that direction, and 
Amin’s Uganda was an example whose short life related to over-use of violence, 
under-use of coherent tactics and failure to maintain workable relations with 
external patrons/protectors.
Self-serving decision-making coalition defined and enforced constitutional 
orders are common in Africa and globally The degree of narrowness and the 
particular makeup of the subclass coalitions vary but the basic natures seem 
similar. Kenya, the Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau and Burkina (today) are 
examples. Regimes, usually but not always authoritarian, without very clear.
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broad, or stable subclass coalition bases are not uncommon, for example, Ghana 
(1982 to date), Burkina (of Sankara), Uganda today, and in a very different way 
Malawi (at least until 1986). Fragility and possibility of sharp change (from 
within the regime as well as by its mutation or demise) may be the only common 
features of such systems; certainly the substantive constitutional order goals of J. 
J. Rawlings and Hastings Banda have little in common.
A final category of limited, potentially pathological or pathological 
constitutional orders (in this case limited, but in danger of more dire futures) are 
those that have had greater breadth, participation, and scope but are 
disintegrating under external or domestic tensions at or near the level of 
organized, large-scale violence and/or disintegration of the resource base 
actually mobilizable by the state and its most important sub-class supporters. 
Post-Nimeiri Sudan illustrated and post-1975 Zambia illustrates this pattern.
But healthier, more broadly based, and arguably evolving/developing 
constitutional orders also exist. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Botswana are all examples and a case can be made for including somewhat 
problematic cases such as Senegal and Gambia.
Starting from a human condition/right to development approach the features 
of assent, participation, access, equity and operationality needed to develop 
constitutional orders can be fairly readily articulated. However, because the 
starting points diverge massively (Sierra Leone is not Tanzania, Cape Verde is 
not Equatorial Guinea, Sudan is not Mozambique, Uganda is not Kenya) as do 
the present dominant decision-making coalitions, the concrete possibilities for, 
requirements of, and constraints on short-term mobilization and action vary 
widely. Except in a handful of cases, constitutional order reconstruction and 
development is a precondition for constitution reform to be effective. Seeking 
once again to substitute a legal engineering superstructure for a constitutional 
order infrastructure is no more likely to be productive now than over 1957-1988. 
Pluralism can play a role in building up the breadth and strength of the 
constitutional order. However, to do so many parallel channel and other 
independent organizations in SSA need to look first at their own constitutional 
orders These are often just as weak, disintegrating or pathological as those of 
states.
ENVOI
Neoliberalism and growthmanship both face rapidly waning credibility and 
legitimacy in SSA. Right to development/human condition strategic and tactical 
approaches, the latter exemplified by the Khartoum Declaration, have gained 
substantial intellectual, policymaker, and operational credibility and support 
I he roles of participation, self-organization, decentralization and accountability 
in these approaches interact with participatory pluralism
Where now is a question subject to intellectual examination, but from the point 
of view of those, predominantly Africans in SSA, whose well-being and in many 
cases literal survival depends on reversal of 1980s trends, the challenge is that of 
the Mara proverb cited by Mwalimu Nyerere:
Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going to kill the ElephantI 
Can you really do it?
Well. I 'll try and try againI
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Table 8.1
Selected Q uality  o f  Life indicators: 1 96 0 -m id -1 9 8 0 s  a
1960 1970 Late
1970s
1980s L ow  Inco m e  
S u b -S a h aran  
A frica  (1982)
1 Average Life Expectancy 
at Birth
45 49 55 53 48
2. Infant Mortality Rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
3. Child Death Rate 27 21 15 25-30 24
4 Access to Health Facility^ - - - 30 45
5. IHiblic llcahh Facility 
Visits per Person per Year
- - 0.7 0.4 2
6. Health Budget as % of 
GDP
- 1.2 - 0.26 0.95
7. Access to Pure Water
Rural . 14 14 48 14
Urban 86 86 75 62
Total _ 35 35 60 22
8. Access to Excreta 
Disposal^
Rural _ 40 40 30 25
Urban 92 95 65 69
Total _ 55 56 44 32
9. Average Caloric 
Availability as a % of 
Requirements
92 97 88 68 91
10. Child Malnutrition
(Moderate/Severe) _ _ 36 5-5 40
11 lYimary Education 
Enrolment Ratio c
38 (46) 64 (75) 69 (80) ,-(80) 69 (-)
12. Adult Literacy 27 30 _ 30-35 44
13. Education Budget as % of
GDP
- 3.9 - 0.85 2.81 .
14 Population Below 
Absolute Poverty Line^
Rural . 60-65 67.5-72.5 65
Urban - - 30-35 45-50 35
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PRINCIPAL SOURCES
World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Division, Economic Analysis and
Projections Department (June 1984), World Development Report 1985;
UNICEF, Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries {April 1985);
UNICEF Ghana: Situation Analysis o f  Women and Children (July 1984)
NOTES
a) 1960 data refer to a year between 1959 and 1961; 1970 between 1969 and 
1971; late 1970s between 1975 and 1980; 1980s to 1982, 1984 or 1985.
b) Defined interms of location within a 5 kilometer radius. May overstate for 
population when facilities available are small.
c) 1970 and late 1970s urban figures may be overstated by failing to relate 
number of water points to population.
d) 1970 and 1978 figures for urban and possibly mral areas overstate by failing 
to relate number of drop-holes to supposed user population.
e) Adjusted for length of primary cycle. ( ) are unadjusted figures. Becauseof 
the primary/middle school division Ghana has a shorter primary cycle than 
most SSA countries.
f) Estimate made by author based on fragmentary data.
Table 8.2
Selected Q uality of Life Ind ica to rs-S ou the rn  A frica and Somalia
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Somaliad
Population (millions) 8.5 1.1 1.5 6.9 14.0 0.6 22.0 6.5 8.5 5.5
Under-5 mortality (per 100 births) 325-375* 100 145 280 325-375* 18^ 185 135 120 174-210
Infant mortality (0-l)(pcr 1,000 
births)
200* 75 110 160 200 125 110 85 75 146-180
Infant and child malnutrition (%) NA 32 NA 31 NA NA (50) 28 NA 16
Average calorie intake relev ant to 
requirements (%)
87 (94) 100 97 79 (108) 101 89 89 (105)
Access to health services (30) (89) NA 80 (30) NA n» 75 71 (20)
Access to safe water 21 (14) (41) (13) 48 (47) 46 (52) 33
Primary enrolment (%)(1982)c 66 76 71 46 46b 84b 87" 94 131 15
Adult (over 15) literacy (%)(1982) 28 61 70 (36) 27 (61) 85b 69 69 16
One-year-olds fully vaccinated 
(%)
TB 40 70 91 72 (46) 95b (84) 87 88 31
DTB 8 82 59 66 (56) 79b (58) 49 68 22
Polio 55 77 64 68 (32) 60b (56) 47 63 22
Measles 62 75 63 64 (32) 5 )b (82) 56 55 36
Life expectancy at birth H I) 55 50 46 (45) 54 52 52 56 45-49
GNP pet capita 490 960 530 180 (230) 790 210 470 760 (350)
( ) = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances
*Re-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account the impact of war. Standard 
projections showing 245 under-5 mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique 
assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate post-independence 
period gains
b 1983
c Net Ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe
d Includes estimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 
through 1986.
Source: Statistics on Children in UNICEF .Assisted Countries, UNICEF, 1986, 
The State o f  the W orld 's Children 1987, Oxford for UNICEF, 1987, except for 
GNP per capita taken from World Bank. W orld Development Report 1986, OUP.
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Table 8.3
Rates o f  E nv ironm enta l D egradation
Countries Sand dune 
encroach­
ment
Deteriorat­
ion in 
rangelands
Forest
depiction
Deteriorat­
ion of 
irrigation
Ramfod 
agricultur­
al problems
General
assessment
Beam 0 * * 0 * *
Burkina
Faso
0 * * * ** *
Cape
Verde
* * 0 * ** */**
Chad ** ** * ** ** **
Djibouti * ** * * NA * /* *
Ethiopia * ** ** * * * /* *
Gambia * * ** ** * *
Ghana 0 * * 0 * *
Guinea 0 0 * * ** *
Guinea
Bissau
0 0 * * * *
Kenya 0 ** ** * * *
Mali * ** ** * * */**
Mauretania * ** ** * * **
Niger * ** * ** * */**
Nigeria 0 * * 0 * *
Senegal * ** * * ** **
Somalia * * * ** * *
Sudan ** * * * 0 *
T anzania 0 * * 0 * *
Uganda 0 ** 0 0 * *
United Rep. 
Cameroon
0 * * 0 * *
Zimbabwe 0 * * 0 * *
KEY: o = stable, * =  Some increase, ** = Significant increase, NA = Not 
applicable
Source: (Adapted) “Desertification Control Bulletin,” United Nations 
Environment Programme, Number 10, May 1984, p 26 and national data.
G rain  Production per capita in 24 A frican C ountries Affected by D rought 
1970-1984
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Figure 8.1
Source: World Bank. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
A Joint Program o f  Action (Washington, D C : 1984), p l4  based on data of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), except that the 
1984 figure is a projection using data front FAO, the United States Agency for 
International Development and the United States Department of Agriculture.
Figure 8.2
Source: World Bank. Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
\ Joint Program o f  Action  (Washington, D C.: 1984), p i5, based on data 
piovided by the United States Department of Agriculture.
Figure 8.3
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M alnu trition  Among C hildren  in Botsw ana and G hana 1980-1984
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Appendix
Excerpts from  The Khartoum Declaration 
This declaration was adopted by the U N. system sponsored, UN Economic 
Commission for Africa organized and led International Conference on the Human 
Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development in March 1988. It was 
subsequently endorsed by the conference of African ministers responsible for “human 
resources” and the 30th Anniversary UNECA Council o f M inisters meeting held in 
Niamey in April 1988.
The Khartoum Declaration
P R E A M B L E
2. The conference made a deep and detailed analysis o f the African situation, 
particularly the current economic crisis and all its ramifications on the people of Africa. 
The Conference is unanimous in its conviction that the crisis that confronts the African 
continent is one that affects the total human condition of the continent and its people, 
men and women alike. It is a crisis that challenges the very survival o f the African 
people. It is a crisis of Africa’s environment as the desert rapidly overcomes the fertility 
o f the land and the coastlines also recede. It is a crisis o f the continent’s natural 
resources exploited more for the benefit o f external interests than to meet Africa’s due 
needs. It is a crisis of the rich cultures o f the African people and the cohesion of families 
broken up by the desperate circumstances o f the African reality. It is a crisis that 
threatens to overwhelm Africa and her people and, in extremis, to reduce them to the 
helpless gaze depicted in the starving faces of Africa’s children m the international 
media. But it is a crisis that can and must be overcome throu^i the concerted and 
determined action of the African people and their societies and states, as they develop a 
clearer understanding of the implications o f the current predicament and fashion a 
decisive and coherent plan of action, with the assistance and understanding of the 
international community.
3 We are encouraged in this view by the fact that although Africa has been sorely 
squeezed by the pressures o f recent years and millions o f Africans have suffered 
severely, no objective observer can fail to be impressed by the vitality, and human 
creativity which strive and flourish in spite o f everything. The large cutbacks and 
constraints o f government and urban production have stimulated communities to devise 
their own solutions to the problem of meeting their own basic human needs. Self-help 
groups abound in every country; the extended family, though strained, has often 
provided the means o f survival o f many of its members; examples o f community action 
can be found in almost every village. It is important to recognize the enormous potential
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o f the human energy and creativity and find ways to harness it rather than ignore it in the 
total process of national recovery and development. For these and other reasons we 
repeat that Africa’s crisis, though dire, CAN AND MUST BE OVERCOME
4. As participants in this event, the overwhelming majority o f whom come from the 
African continent, we are moved to place on record our collective voice on the issues we 
discussed and we accordingly make this KHARTOUM DECLARATION.
A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT O F T H E  HUMAN CONDITION IN 
AFRICA
5. Since the human being is the center o f all development, the human condition is the 
only final measure o f development. Improving that condition is essential for the poor and 
vulnerable human beings who comprise the majority o f our peoples in Africa. Africa’s 
men and women are the main factors and the ends for whom and by whom any program 
and implementation of development must be justified.
6. Regrettably, over the past decade the human condition of most Africans has 
deteriorated calamitously. Real incomes o f almost all households and families declined 
sharply. Malnutrition has risen massively, food production has fallen relative to 
population, the quality and quantity o f health and education services have deteriorated. 
Famine and war have made tens o f m illions o f human beings refugees and displaced 
persons. In many cases, the slow decline o f infant mortality and of death from 
preventable, epidemic diseases has been reversed M eanwhile the unemployment and 
underemployment situation has worsened markedly
7. Acts o f destabilization and aggression, being perpetrated against the countries of 
Southern Africa by the South Africa regime, have also imposed massive human and 
economic costs, greatly in excess o f m ilitary budgets or battle casualties. O f the 
approximately one million human beings dead in Southern Africa as a result of South 
African aggression over 1980-1986 about one hundred thousand were war-dead, 
naiTOwly defined. Of the approximately thirty billion dollars in lost production, most 
relates to the creation of chaos and the loss o f peasants’ crops and national production.
8. Production and other economic aspects o f development, especially distribution, are of 
crucial importance, production by the poor is vital if they are to become more able to 
meet at least their basic needs. But it is just as important who produces what. 
Production of food, o f basic consumer goods, o f agricultural inputs and construction 
materials, o f basic services such as health, education, and pure water, as well as of 
exports are central to improving the human condition Unsustainable imbalances do 
matter.
9. Nutrition imbalances are as crucial as trade imbalances. High infant mortality 
requires just as immediate and as serious an attention as high rates o f inflation or huge 
budget deficits. Ultimately the trade, inflation and budget imbalances are serious 
obstacles to development because they are barriers to enabling the poor to produce more.
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to the vulnerable to surviving and rehabilitating themselves; and to the state and the 
society achieving universal access to basic services.
10. Therefore, a basic test for all stabilization, adjustment and development programs is 
whether they will improve the human condition from their inception or, on the contrary, 
worsen it Social services and human resources development programs have high short-, 
medium- and long-term payoffs on economic as well as on broader development criteria
11. They are relevant to the reversal o f unsustainable imbalances since survival and 
rehabilitation assistance to the most vulnerable groups; international refugees and 
displaced persons, disabled persons, youth, women and children, is an important element 
in reversing production losses. Similarly, the engagement o f Africa’s most basic 
resource, its approximately 250 million economically active people, in production, is 
essential to restoring growth as well as development
12. The human-centered strategy to the implementing of the Lagos Plan of Action, 
APPER and UN-PAAERD is vital for reaching out to the aspirations and needs of 
Africa’s people and especially their poor and vulnerable majorities. It is deliverable 
through the appropriate mobilization, allocation and use o f resources. To bring this 
about it will be essential to restore the strained and tom fabrics o f our societies, make 
popular participation in decision-making processes effective, ensure the preservation of 
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and eliminate policies that discriminate 
against minorities and vulnerable groups.
13. Progress in advancing the human condition in Africa depends on the structure, 
pattern and political context o f socio-economic development The problems and 
weaknesses in these areas must therefore be recognized and attempts must be made to 
tackle them in order to achieve the objectives o f social and human development This is 
also necessary because the economic crisis which Africa faced from the late 1970s found 
fertile ground in the structural and political weaknesses that bred the germs that hastened 
the intolerable deterioration in the human condition.
14. A fundamental problem is the fast rate o f population growth and the uneven and 
uneconomic distribution of the population in the different age groups The youthful 
population makes high demands on educational, medical and other social services while 
the large number o f college graduates and school leavers that enter the labor market each 
year creates an imbalance between labor supply and demand.
15. A further structural factor is the urban bias and socially unequal distribution of
critical factors and resources for human development such as employment, income, food 
and nutrition and health and education As is well known, this distribution is biased 
against the majority o f the population living mainly in the rural areas and in favor of the 
politically vocal minority in the urban enclaves. Economic issues have overshadowed 
social concerns and have prevented African countries from according the needed 
centrality to the human dimension and the human factor.
16. Finally, the political context for promoting healthy human development has been
marred, for more than two decades, by instability, war, intolerance, restrictions on the 
(icedom and human rights o f individuals and groups as well as overcentralization of 
power with attendant restrictions on popular participation in decision-making. In such a
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context, the motivation of many Africans to achieve their best in productivity and the 
enhancem ent o f their own and society’s well-being has been severely constrained. In 
tim es o f economic crisis, the politically stronger social groups and individuals survive 
w hile the weaker ones go under in increasing deprivation, social dislocation, hunger, ill- 
health or death.
B. T H E  HUMAN DIMENSION OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTM ENT 
PROGRAM S
17. From the causes mentioned so far flow the consequences of wretched misery, 
marginalization and, for millions, very literally premature death. The severity o f the 
African crisis is such that country after country has been putting in place structural 
adjustment programs in their effort to halt their economic degradation and achieve a 
turn-around. Unfortunately, far too many of these programs, whether nationally 
conceived or in collaboration with the World Bank, the International M onetary Fund 
and the donor community, are rending the fabric of the African society. Rather than 
improve the human condition, some Structural Adjustment Programs have aggravated it 
because they are incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a tim e perspective.
18. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are incomplete because they are often 
implemented as if fiscal, trade and price balances are ends in themselves and are 
virtually complete sets o f means to production increases. Human condition imbalances 
as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, health and education do not receive equal 
priority in attention to macro-economic imbalances. Unless and until they make the 
elimination of these human condition imbalances central targets, stabilization and 
adjustment programs cannot provide Africa’s growth and development dynamic.
19. They are too mechanistic in being inadequately grounded in, or sensitive to specific 
national economic, human and cultural realities. This is aggravated by an incomplete 
articulation which allows the gaps between macro models and contextual realities to 
remain largely unobserved. Nor can we evaluate how rapidly production can be 
expanded; where, by whom and of what. Thus their human condition impact remains 
inadequately projected instead of being at the center of target-setting, policy formulation 
and program or project choice.
20. They are in too short a time perspective. Africa cannot wait for the attainment o f 
external equilibrium and fiscal balance before seeking to improve the human condition, 
nor can long-term human investment to strengthen the institutional, scientific, technical 
and productive capacity operating in environmental balance be postponed. That is 
essential to attaining the more stable and less vulnerable economic position that we 
aspire to for the African continent.
21 Further, we must place squarely on record that the external context confronting 
Africa continues to deteriorate. The terms of trade losses o f 1986 vastly exceeded net 
resource transfers to Africa. APPER is not receiving either the new concessional 
transfer support or the debt burden relief it projects as essential, or which U N-PAAERD
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committed the international community to providing. This is not simply an African 
view, the W orld Bank has repeatedly said the same thing as has the UN Secretary 
G eneral’s Advisory Group on Financial Flow for Africa, a majority o f whom are 
practicing bankers.
22. W e welcome the increased concern for the human dimension in stabilization and 
adjustment programs, broadly expressed within the international community But this is 
far from being enough. The gap between the expression of concern and actual program 
implementation remains wide. Human dimension elements are additions, often long 
after program initiation, rather than integral parts o f their overall design. Those poor and 
vulnerable groups to be served are often narrowed down to those who are the victims of 
the stabilization program, rather than addressing the human condition of all the 
absolutely poor and vulnerable people.
23 In the light o f all the foregoing, we do not hesitate to reiterate the central position 
that the human dimension should be accorded in the stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs, for we are convinced beyond doubt that no nation can be great and 
prosperous if the majority o f its people are poor, malnourished, illiterate, miserable and 
perpetually vulnerable.
24. Overall, we identify five distinct areas on which greater awareness and action must 
be focused by the African governments, the international financial institutions and the 
international community at large. Firstly, all structural adjustment programs in Africa 
must be designed, implemented and monitored as part of the long-term framework of 
Africa’s development. These programs must, therefore, be incontrovertibly compatible 
with the objectives and aspirations of the African people as outlined in the Lagos Plan of 
Action and the Final Act o f Lagos. Secondly, the human dimension must be the fulcrum 
of the adjustment programs. Thirdly, the structural adjustment policies must incorporate 
the relevant adjustments o f the social sector. Fourthly, considerations must be made of 
the consequences o f macro-policies on the poor and vulnerable not only so as to design 
temporary and independent compensatory additional programs but to make the 
alleviation of absolute and relative poverty and the elimination o f gender biases integral 
parts and factors o f the adjustment programs. Lastly, the entire process o f monitoring 
the stabilization and structural adjustment programs must incorporate the social aspects 
and criteria.
25. We regard it as the primary responsibility o f African Governments to develop a 
richer articulation of the total macro-framework within which to reorientate these
programs.
26. Structural adjustment programs must be made to complement the efforts o f African 
Governments to attain their long-term development objectives. Consequently, they 
should, through their effects on the economy and the African social fabric, contribute to 
the preservation o f basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and help to eliminate 
policies that discriminate against minority and vulnerable groups. Above all, the 
application of structural adjustment measures should restore, not corrode the dignity of 
the African as a human being.
